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REGULATORY TAKINGS: DISTINGUISHING
BETWEEN THE PRIVILEGE OF USE AND DUTY
"Beyond the limits of his confining skin, no man can own any thing.
'Property'refers not to things owned but to the rights granted by society;
they must periodically be re-examined ... .
I. INTRODUCTION

Penn Central TransportationCo. v. City of New York is the first in a

line of Supreme Court opinions, spanning roughly the last twenty years,
that addresses the law of regulatory takings.' These decisions have sent
takings jurisprudence through a maze of "ad hoc"4 and "per se"' tests,
leaving observers bewildered when attempting to access, understand,

1. GARRETT HARDIN, EXPLORING NEW ETHICS FOR SURVIVAL

127 (1972).

Before

arriving to this conclusion Hardin noted:
We often speak of the "rights of private property," but what is "property"? The
word has many meanings, among which are the following.
If I say, "I own this land" Iimply that:
a. I can use the land;
b. I can abuse the land;
c. I can sell the land (i.e., I can break the tie of responsibility between
my land and me).
In an uncrowded world there may be no reason to restrict a person's freedom to do
all three. But in a spaceship, where land is forever limited, there is a limit to our
tolerance of the misuse of the heritage which our generation has received from our
ancestors and which we hope to pass on to our descendants. Flagrant abuse is,
indeed, almost certain to provoke us to limiting our neighbor's freedom to do what
he wishes with "his property." An acute and abiding awareness of the imminence of
posterity leads us to conclude that private property is not so much something that a
man owns as it is something for which he is a trustee. His enjoyment of certain
rights with respect to "his" property is-or should be-conditional upon his
acceptance of the implied obligations of trusteeship.
Id. at 126-27. Early in his discussion, Hardin points out "the inescapable truth" that the earth
is a spaceship. Id. at 16.
2. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
3. Id.; Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505
U.S. 1003 (1992); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987). The
law of takings originates with the Takings Clause found in the Bill of Rights-"nor shall
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
4. Penn Cent. Trans. Co., 438 U.S. at 124.
5. Jed Rubenfeld, Usings, 102 YALE L.J. 1077, 1093 (1993) (discussing the Court's
takings analysis in Lucas, 505 U.S. 1003).
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and apply the law. Commentators have eloquently described the law of
takings as "engulfed in confusion," 6 "suffer[ing] from its own
inconsistency,' ' 7 "a problem of considerable difficulty,"8 and "a secret
code that only a momentary majority of the Court is able to
understand."9 Into these unsettled waters the Supreme Court sailed, in
2001, to hear Palazzolo v. Rhode Island."

The Court's decision in Palazzolo proves important for a number of
reasons. The Court dismissed the suggestion by certain courts that Penn
Central no longer serves as the standard by which to decide regulatory
takings claims.'

Instead, Palazzolo verifies that Penn Central still

applies to cases in which there has not been "a deprivation of all
economic value."' 2 The Court, however, rejected a long-standing
assumption made by courts and scholars alike-buyers of property are
barred from bringing regulatory takings claims to challenge regulations
effective prior to their acquisition. " By rejecting this proposition, the
6. Id. at 1078.
7. Christopher S. Kiefer, Reconciling the Internal Inconsistency and Resolving the
DenominatorProblem in Takings Law, 10 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 171,171 (2000).
8. Penn Cent. Trans. Co., 438 U.S. at 123 (Brennan, J., delivering the opinion of the
Court).
9. Michael A. Heller & James E. Krier, Deterrence and Distribution in the Law of
Takings, 112 HARV. L.REV.997,997 (1999).
10. 533 U.S. 606 (2001).
11. Id. at 632. Compare, e.g., Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171,
1179 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (rejecting the ad hoc Penn Central balancing test in regulatory takings
cases and noting that "[Lucas] removed from regulatory takings the vagaries of the balancing
process, so dependent on judicial perceptions with little effective guidance in law."), with, e.g.,
Lynda J. Oswald, Cornering the Quark: Investment-Backed Expectations and Economically
Viable Uses in Takings Analysis, 70 WASH. L.REV. 91, 96 (1995) (stating that "[t]he Court
has identified two per se tests for takings; all other cases are decided under ad hoc rules").
The two categorical takings situations "are those involving permanent physical invasions" and
the deprivation of all economic viability. Id.
12. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 632.
13. See, e.g., id. at 626-30; Creppel v. United States, 41 F.3d 627, 632 (Fed. Cir. 1994)
(stating that reasonable investment-backed expectations, one factor in the Penn Central test
"limits recovery to owners who can demonstrate that they bought their property in reliance
on the nonexistence of the challenged regulation. One who buys with knowledge of a
restraint assumes the risk of economic loss." See also infra Part III.B); Broadwater Farms
Joint Venture v. United States, 45 Fed. Cl. 154, 156 (Fed. Cl. 1999) ("Where a regulatory
scheme is in place at the time of purchase ... the reasonableness of the buyer's expectations
must be discounted."); Brace v. United States, 48 Fed. Cl. 272 (Fed. Cl. 2000); Frank I.
Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just
Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV 1165, 1238 (1967) (arguing that a takings claim would
even be weak when a buyer purchased property before the land-use restrictions were adopted
if the buyer "knew [the land] might be subjected to restrictions."). Michelman argues that in
such a situation-where restrictions already exist or when the purchaser has knowledge of the
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Court has opened the door for property owners to bring takings
challenges against all land-use regulation, regardless of the date of
enactment or the identity of the owner when enacted. Although this
holding is logical, as a practical matter it is bound to further muddle a
"doctrine-in-most-desperate-need-of-a-principle,"1 4 while also increasing
the frequency of litigation. Adding this decision to the land-use
challenges the nation increasingly faces-due to population growth,
environmental concerns, and the depletion of natural resources-leaves
little doubt that it is imperative to adopt a comprehensible standard for
regulatory takings. The purpose of this Comment is to present such a
regulatory takings standard.
The proposed standard is based loosely on Wesley Hohfeld's
explanation of legal rights."5 This Comment adopts Hohfeld's analysis of
legal rights because it describes the substance of each "stick" in the
"bundle of rights" associated with property ownership. 6 Upon
application of Hohfeld's analysis, it is apparent that legal concepts that
are commonly referred to in the law as property "rights" are actually a
conglomeration of, among other things, claims, privileges, and duties. 7
The inquiry courts should make when determining whether
compensation is necessary in a regulatory takings case should be the
following: "What type of right is interfered with?" In situations in which
government regulates a duty or only partially interferes with an owner's
privilege to use his property, government interference without
compensation will not violate the Fifth Amendment.
The recommended standard is not designed to drastically alter
regulatory takings jurisprudence because the case law generally agrees
possibility of restrictions in the future-the purchase price reflects these restrictions. Id.
Thus, as far as the buyer is concerned, the government has taken nothing. Id.; cf. infra notes
157-61 and accompanying text (detailing how different Justices on the Supreme Court believe
existing regulations should be considered in a takings analysis, including Justice Stevens who
argued that "it is the person who owned the property at the time of the taking that is entitled
to the recovery." Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 639 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part)). But see Oswald, supra note 11, at 122 n.158 (disagreeing with Michelman and stating,
"that the timing of the property owner's acquisition of the property at stake is irrelevant to
the determination of whether the regulation effects a taking"). See also infra note 150
(providing more authority for this proposition).
14. Rubenfeld, supra note 5, at 1081; see also discussion infra notes 157-60 and
accompanying text (pointing out how divided the Court is on the proper application of this
holding).
15. Thomas D. Perry, A Paradigm of Philosophy: Hohfeld on, Legal Rights, 14 AM.
PHIL. Q. 41, 41-42 (1977).
16. See discussion infra Part IV.
17. Perry, supra note 15 at 41-42.
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with results that would be reached through applying the proposed legal
test. Instead, the proposed standard is designed to serve the following
purposes: (1) to bring clarity to a confounded area of the law; and (2) to
provide flexibility for the law to address a variety of environmental and
natural resource issues, recognizing that "land is forever limited.""
Although this Comment briefly discusses elements of Hohfeld's
observations that are essential to understanding the proposed standard,
this Comment does not discuss the philosophy of property. Nor does
this Comment present a history of the law of regulatory takings. 9
Rather, Part II of this Comment analyzes the regulatory takings tests in
the wake of Palazzolo. Part III addresses problems in the current
regulatory takings doctrine. Part IV presents an alternative standard for
regulatory takings based upon identifying the nature of the property
owner's infringed right.
II.

PALAZZOLO AND ITS IMPACT ON THE LAW OF REGULATORY
TAKINGS

A. Palazzolo'sFacts and Holdings
The facts of Palazzolo are common to disputes arising over
environmental regulation. In 1959, Anthony Palazzolo and associates
formed Shore Gardens, Inc. (SGI) to purchase three adjoining
waterfront parcels containing mostly salt marsh in Westerly, Rhode
Island. 0 Shortly thereafter, Palazzolo bought out the other SGI
shareholders and made plans to develop the property.2' Between 1962
and 1966, SGI submitted three applications to fill the land.22 SGI's
applications were denied by various state government departments,
which claimed that there were inadequacies in the proposals such 23as
"lack of essential information" and "adverse environmental impacts."
During the 1970s, SGI made no attempts to develop the property. 24
It was at this time, however, that Rhode Island passed legislation
creating the Rhode Island Coastal Resources Management Council (the
18. See HARDIN, supra note 1, at 126.

19. For those interested in the history of the takings doctrine, see, for example,
Rubenfeld, supra note 5, at 1081-94.
20. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606,613 (2001).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 614.
23. Id.
24. Id.
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Council), "an agency charged with the duty of protecting the State's
coastal properties. 2 1
Pursuant to this authority, the Council
promulgated the Rhode Island Coastal Resources Management
Program (CRMP).26 According to CRMP regulations, almost all of
SGI's property was designated as coastal wetlands. 2 Twice during the
early 1980s-after SGI's corporate charter was revoked-Palazzolo
submitted applications to the Council to fill and develop at least part of
his salt marsh. 8 The Council denied both applications. Ultimately, the
Council held that Palazzolo could not attain a "special exception" to the
CRMP because his proposed use for the land did not "serve 'a
compelling public purpose which provides benefits to the public as a
whole as opposed to individual or private interests."'30
The second denial by the Council led Palazzolo to appeal to the
Rhode Island courts.'
When the Council's decision was affirmed,
Palazzolo filed an inverse condemnation claim seeking $3,150,000 in
damages.32 Palazzolo argued that the CRMP "as applied by the Council
to his parcel, had taken the property without compensation in violation
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments."33 After an adverse ruling by
the Superior Court, Palazzolo's arguments were also rejected by the
Rhode Island Supreme Court.
The Rhode Island Supreme Court
affirmed the trial court's decision because, inter alia, "[Palazzolo] had
no right to challenge regulations predating 1978, when he succeeded to
legal ownership of the property from SGI." " His claim under Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council36 that his property had been "depriv[ed]

of all economically beneficial use was contradicted by [the] evidence,"37
and a partial takings claim under the Penn Central test also had to fail
because he could have had no reasonable investment-backed

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
130A(1)
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 611.
Id. at 614-15.
Id.
Id. at 615 (quoting the Rhode Island Coastal Resources Management Program §
(1983)).
Id.
Id. at 615-16.
Id. at 615.
Id. at 616.
Id.; see also discussion infra note 38.
505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 616.
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expectations since the CRMP predated his ownership of the land.38
Palazzolo appealed to the United States Supreme Court for relief and
certiorari was granted. 9
The Supreme Court affirmed the Rhode Island Supreme Court's
decision that, under the Lucas test, Palazzolo's claim must fail because
the evidence established that Palazzolo's property retained considerable
value.4" The Court, however, reversed the Rhode Island Court's holding
that Palazzolo was excluded from challenging regulations enacted prior

to his acquiring the property.4 Finally, the Court remanded the case to
be examined under the Penn Central partial takings analysis in light of
the Court's conclusion that future property owners are not barred from
challenging earlier enacted land regulations.42
B. Regulatory Takings in the Wake of Palazzolo

Palazzolo is an important decision in at least two respects. First, it
reaffirms the propriety of applying the Penn Central test to regulatory

takings claims in which the property in question retains more than token
value.43 Second, Palazzolo rejects the theory that buyers of property are
barred from bringing regulatory takings claims to challenge regulations
effective prior to acquisition." The consequence of this holding is that
property owners now have two theories to use when challenging any
land-use regulation: Penn Centralclaims and Lucas claims.45 To discuss

the current regulatory takings doctrine, identification of the elements of
each claim is necessary.
38. Id. The Rhode Island Supreme Court found that Palazzolo's ownership of the
waterfront parcel began after SGI's corporate charter was revoked, not while Palazzolo was
sole stockholder of SGI. Palazzolo v. State ex rel Tavares, 746 A.2d 707, 717 (R.I. 2000).
According to this reasoning, because the CRMP was enacted while SGI was still a
corporation, when Palazzolo was later transferred the title, he took title subject to whatever
restrictions the CRMP placed on his property. Id. Thus, at the time the property was
transferred to Palazzolo, he could have had no reasonable investment-backed expectations
that would be in contradiction of the CRMP. Id.
39. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 531 U.S. 923 (2001).
40. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 630-32. Palazzolo did not dispute the State's finding that,
even subject to the CRMP, "his parcel retained $200,000 in development value." Id. at 63031.
41. Id. at 632; see also discussion infra Part III.B.3.
42. Palazzolo,533 U.S. at 630.
43. Id. at 632.
44. Id. at 626-30; see also discussion infra Part III.B.3.
45. See Palazzolo,533 U.S. at 630-32. Lucas claims are based on the Court's holding in
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992), discussed infra notes 58-68 and
accompanying text.
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Referred to as "ad hoc, factual inquiries,"46 Penn Central claims,
based on the Supreme Court's holding in Penn Central Transportation
Co. v. City of New York,47 are made by landowners who believe that

government regulation has unconstitutionally deprived their property of
some of its value. In Penn Central, the Court considered whether a
historical preservation law adopted by New York City violated the
Takings Clause 49 because it effectively prevented Penn Central from
constructing a skyscraper atop Grand Central Station.0 The Court held
that the regulation did not violate the Takings Clause, as applied to the
While discussing the
states by the Fourteenth Amendment."'
jurisprudence of the Takings Clause, the Court pointed out its inability
"to develop any 'set formula' for determining when 'justice and fairness'
require that economic injuries caused by public action be compensated
by the government, rather than remain disproportionately concentrated
on a few persons."52 To arrive at its decision, the Court compiled a
number of significant factors, identified during "ad hoc, factual
inquiries" of prior cases, and applied them to the case at the bar. 3
These factors include "[tihe economic impact of the regulation on
the claimant and, particularly, the extent to which the regulation has
interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations," as well as "the
character of the governmental action."5" The analysis may also consider
the breadth, function, and public interest-including health, safety,
Ultimately, "a use
morals, and general welfare-of the regulation.
if not reasonably
a
'taking'
real
property
may
constitute
restriction on
necessary to the effectuation of a substantial public purpose or perhaps
if it has an unduly harsh impact upon the owner's use of the property." 6
46. Penn Cent. Trans. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
47. Id.
48. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 632.
49. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[N]or shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation").
50. Penn Cent. Trans. Co., 438 U.S. at 116-18.
51. Id. at 138.
52. Id. at 123-24 (citing Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962)).
53. Id. at 124.
54. Id.
55. See id. at 133.
56. Id. at 127 (citing Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188 (1928); Moore v. East
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 513-14 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring)). A problem with this
"substantial public purpose standard," also relied on by the Lucas Court, see discussion infra
note 63, is that it confuses the law of takings with due process. The Court suggested that
there are two situations in which a regulatory taking may occur: 1) a regulation is "not
reasonably necessary to ...effectuat[e] a substantial public purpose," or 2) a regulation "has
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The burden on a landowner to establish a regulatory taking under
Penn Central is a difficult obstacle to overcome. In the words of one
federal appellate judge, "[f]ew regulations will flunk this nearly vacuous
test. In fact, the Supreme Court has only once found a partial taking to
be compensable, and even then only a plurality applied the partial
takings analysis." 7
In the alternative, where landowners believe they can establish that
a regulation has deprived all, or nearly all, "'economically viable use'"58

of their property, they may bring a Lucas claim59 based upon the

0
Supreme Court's holding in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council."

The Lucas Court considered whether a South Carolina law, which
an unduly harsh impact upon the owner's use of the property." Penn Cent. Trans. Co., 438
U.S. at 127. While a land use restriction advancing no state interest may be found
unconstitutional as a violation of due process, see, e.g., Moore, 431 U.S. 494 (holding that an
ordinance limiting occupancy of a dwelling to close family members violates due process),
may the restriction also be declared a taking even though it costs the landowner nothing?
According to Donald H. Ziegler, "[c]learly not." Donald H. Zeigler, The New Activist Court,
45 AM. U. L. REV. 1367, 1377 (1996). Zeigler argued that the only logical way to interpret
the Court's suggestion that a land-use regulation may constitute a taking if it "'does not
substantially advance legitimate state interests or denies an owner economically viable use of
his land,"' is to change the "or" to "and." Id. (quoting Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255,
260 (1980)). By replacing "or" with "and," according to the resulting standard there is only
one situation in which a regulatory taking occurs-when a regulation fails to advance a
legitimate state interest and the owner is denied of all economically viable use of the
property. Id.
57. Dist. Intown Props. Ltd. P'ship v. Dist. of Columbia, 198 F.3d 874, 886 (D.C. Cir.
1999) (Williams, J., concurring) (citing E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498 (1998)). Eastern
Enterprises, the case to which Judge Williams refers, arose out of an attempt by Congress to
solve the problem of funding retired coal miners' health benefits. E. Enters., 524 U.S. at 537.
A close read of the case reveals that, despite the plurality's opinion, a majority of the Court
actually agrees that the Takings Clause does not even apply, let alone resolve the issue as a
taking. See generally id. at 539-47 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in
part); id. at 553-58 (Breyer, J., dissenting, joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg).
These five Justices disagree with the application of the Takings Clause because they argue
that, in order for there to be a takings issue there must be "a specific property right or
interest ...at stake." Id. at 541 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in
part); accord id. at 554 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Instead, Eastern Enterprises involves
"ordinary liability." Id. at 554 (Breyer, J., dissenting); accord id. at 543 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part). Courts are reluctant to find a taking
where the property at issue retains more than token value. E.g., Ruth Energy, Inc., v. United
States, 270 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Dist. Intown Props. Ltd. P'ship v. Dist. of Columbia, 23
F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 1998), aff'd, 198 F.3d 874 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Sanitation and Recycling
Ind., Inc. v. City of New York, 928 F. Supp. 407 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
58. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 (1992) (quoting Agins, 447 U.S. at
260) (emphasis omitted).
59. Often referred to as a taking "per se." Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1052 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
60. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
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effectively barred Lucas from building oceanfront homes adjacent to the
beach, violated the Takings Clause.61 In contrast to the ad hoc factual
inquiry adopted by the Penn Central Court, 2 the Lucas Court employed
an economic impact standard; relying on dicta in Agins v. City of
Tiburon,63 the Court held that the Takings Clause is violated whenever' ' a4
regulation "'denies an owner economically viable use of his land. "
Once the total deprivation of economic viability has been found,
compensation is necessary unless the regulations are no different than
the restrictions already imposed upon the property due to 65the
"background principles of the State's law of property and nuisance."
Practically speaking, a Lucas claim is likely to be the least common
of the two types of claims just discussed because of the high burden on
landowners to establish that their property lacks any economic value
due to government regulation. 66 This was an issue of contention even in
Lucas due to a suspicious finding of fact by the trial court that the

regulation had rendered the oceanfront property "valueless." 67 This
to declare that "the trial court's conclusion is
finding led Justice Souter
68

highly questionable."
The Palazzolo Court clarified that the applicable regulatory takings
61. Id.
62. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104,124 (1978).
63. 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980) (stating in dicta that "[t]he application of a general zoning
law to particular property effects a taking if the ordinance does not substantially advance
legitimate state interests or denies an owner economically viable use of his land.") (citations
omitted); see also Zeigler, supra note 56, at 1377-79 (pointing out that the dicta Justice Scalia
relied upon makes no sense because a regulation making a minor land use restriction that fails
to advance a legitimate state interest would not be found to violate the Takings Clause and he
took the sentence totally out of context).
64. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016 (quoting Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980))
(emphasis omitted).
65. Id. at 1029.
66. Zeigler, supra note 56, at 1380.
67. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1007.
68. Id. at 1076 (Souter, J., statement). In his independent statement, Justice Souter
argued that, although determining "what constitutes total deprivation [of property] deserves
the Court's attention, as does the relationship between nuisance abatement and such total
deprivation," the Court mistakenly addressed these issues in Lucas. Id. at 1078. In response
to the unreviewable factual finding that the property in Lucas had been deprived of all
economic viability, Justice Souter stated that "it is difficult to imagine property that can be
used only to create a nuisance, such that its sole economic value must presuppose the right to
occupy it for such seriously noxious activity." Id. Due to the likelihood that the factual
conclusions reached at trial were in error, the Lucas case presented a poor opportunity to
face these issues on the merits. Id. Instead, claims Justice Souter, the Court should have
dismissed the writ of certiorari and waited for the opportunity to "confront these matters
directly." Id.

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[86:617

test-either Penn Central or Lucas-depends on the degree to which
regulation deprives owners of the "economically beneficial use" of their
property.69 In the wake of Palazzolo, there is no question that Lucas
applies only to those cases in which regulation leaves the property
"'economically idle.'"70 All other regulatory takings claims-those in
which the property retains more than token value-should be analyzed
under the Penn Central standard.71 By clarifying that the degree of
economic devaluation determines which rule applies, Palazzolo should
aid future regulatory takings analysis.
Aside from delineating the two types of regulatory takings claims,
Palazzolo fails to address the issues that so thoroughly permeate the
Takings Clause with confusion. Before an alternative standard can be
discussed, it is appropriate to consider some of.these problematic issues
separately. First, there is a discussion of how the Court has struggled to
balance two considerations often at odds: (1) the economic impact that
regulation has on property; and (2) the harm to the public that
regulation is designed to abate. Second, there is an examination of
how the ambiguous notion of investment-backed expectations has
muddled the takings doctrine and how Palazzolo is likely to further
confound this concept." The final issue considered is how the doctrine
of nuisance has also complicated application of the Takings Clause.
III. PROBLEMS IN THE TAKINGS DOCTRINE
A. The Conflict Within: A Tale of Two Doctrines
One recurring issue facing courts confronted with the current takings
analysis is the inconsistent and contradictory applications of two distinct
doctrines labeled by one commentator as "the harm principle and the
economic-impact test."" The harm principle is based upon a belief that
when the government is abating harmful or noxious use, hereinafter
"nuisance, '76 any regulation is constitutional because such government
69. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617 (2001).
70. Id. at 631 (quoting Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019).
71. Id. at 617.
72. See infra Part III.A.
73. See infra Part III.B.
74. See infra Part III.C.
75. Rubenfeld, supra note 5, at 1088.
76. These terms are not always understood to be interchangeable. See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C.
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1026-29 (1992) (stating that a regulation totally depriving
property of economic value while abating a noxious-use will require compensation unless the
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action is a valid exercise of the police power."' The economic-impact
test presents a theory in which the "diminution of value would be a
decisive factor in determining the existence of a 'taking."'78 The conflict
between the harm principle and the economic-impact test is apparent
whenever a regulation

abating a nuisance"

completely devalues

property of all economically viable use. On one hand, if a court applies
the harm principle, the property owner is probably out of luck., ° On the
other hand, if the Court applies the economic-impact test, most likely
owner.81
the government will be forced to compensate the property
The conflict between the economic-impact test and the harm
principle has remained unresolved for eighty years. The earliest
manifestation of the conflict can be found in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon.82 The Mahon Court determined whether a statute forbidding
the mining of "coal in such a way as to cause the subsidence of... any
structure used as a human habitation" constituted a taking of the coal
beneath Mahon's residence.83 Writing for the majority, Justice Holmes
stated that although regulation was generally permissible, "if regulation
goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.,8 4 This statement marks
the birth of the economic-impact test; as far as Justice Holmes was
concerned, the threshold inquiry in a takings analysis is the degree to
which a regulation devalues property."
In his dissent, Justice Brandeis expressed support for the harm
principle.86 Justice Brandeis argued that there is no absolute right to use
land.87 Once a use is recognized as a nuisance, even if it was previously
acceptable, "the Legislature has power to prohibit such uses without

restricted use is already prohibited by the background principles of property law or nuisance).
77. Rubenfeld, supra note 5, at 1085 (citing Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887)). In
Mugler, the Court used the harm principle to reject a takings challenge to a law prohibiting
the manufacture or sale of alcohol. See Mugler, 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
78. Rubenfeld, supra note 5, at 1087 (citing Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922)).
79. See discussion supra note 76 and accompanying text (broadly defining nuisance for
the sake of this discussion).
80. E.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987); Mugler,
123 U.S. 623 (1887).
81. E.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); Pa. Coal Co:, 260 U.S. 393.
82. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
83. Id. at 412-13.
84. Id. at 415.
at 413.
85. See id.
86. See id. at 417 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
87. Id. (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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paying compensation.""8 In contrast to Justice Holmes, whose takings
analysis focus is the economic impact on the property, Justice Brandeis's
threshold inquiry is the character of the government action; if the state
is abating a nuisance, then it is validly exercising its police power and
compensation is unnecessary."
Like the Mahon Court, the Court stands today divided over which
doctrine-the harm principle or the economic-impact test-is the proper
doctrine to apply to regulatory takings cases. The Lucas case is the most
recent decision clearly addressing the conflict between the economicimpact test and the harm principle." Writing for the majority, Justice
Scalia used the economic-impact test to create a per se rule that a
regulation depriving property of all economically viable use constitutes
a taking.9 It is evident, however, that Justice Scalia was internally
conflicted regarding the proper application of the two principles; he
qualified his per se rule, based on the economic-impact test, with the
nuisance exception9-a manifestation of the harm principle.
Essentially, in regards to the proper relationship between the economicimpact test and the harm principle, the majority believed that in "total"
takings cases the economic-impact test requires compensation unless a
narrow version of the harm principle applies, in which event
compensation is unnecessary."
As Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion and the two dissenting
opinions reveal, Justice Scalia is not the only Justice questioning a per se
rule based on the economic-impact test." Justice Kennedy not only
implied that the harm principle, as manifested in the nuisance exception,
may extinguish the need for a state to compensate when its regulations
deprive property of all economically beneficial use, but further stated
that he "do[es] not believe [that nuisance] can be the sole source of state
authority to impose severe restrictions."95 Similarly, both Justices
Blackmun and Stevens argued that the harm principle is paramount.96
88. Id. (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
89. See id. (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
90. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
91. Id. at 1015.
92. Id. at 1029. Justice Scalia stated that another exception should be made for the
'background principles of the State's law of property." Id.
93. See id.
94. See generally id. at 1032-76 (Kennedy, J., concurring; Blackmun, J., dissenting;
Stevens, J., dissenting).
95. Id. at 1035 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
96. Id. at 1051 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 1068 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Quoting the majority opinion in Keystone Bituminous Coal Association
v. DeBenedictis" Blackmun stated that, because there is no right to use
property as a nuisance, state regulation of "'nuisance-like activity'"
therefore takes nothing.98
Since Lucas, the Court has yet to reconsider the conflict between the
economic-impact test and the harm principle. Because the record
established that the land retained significant value, the Palazzolo Court
had no opportunity to address the issue." Eventually, if the Court
wishes to achieve consistency, this conflict must be resolved.
B. Interferingwith Investment-Backed Expectations and Lifting the Bar
on Subsequent Owners
Investment-backed expectations are part of the takings doctrine
because the Court has recognized that prohibiting a prospective use may
destroy the value of property as effectively as prohibiting a current use
or direct appropriation.&° One common example of how devastating
prohibitions on prospective use can be is when, under section 404 of the
Clean Water Act, the Army Corps of Engineers denies a landowner's
application for a permit to fill wetlands. 0' In many of these cases, the
landowners are left with land retaining a mere token of its former
value." 2 If, however, takings were limited to cases in which the state

97. 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
98. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1051 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. at
491 n.20); accord Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1068 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
99. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 630-31 (2001).
100. R.S. Radford & J. David Breemer, Great Expectations: Will Palazzolo v. Rhode
Island Clarify the Murky Doctrine of Investment-Backed Expectations in Regulatory Takings
Law?, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 449, 454 (2001) (citing Michelman, supra note 13, at 1233
(stating that "a ban on potential uses not yet established may destroy market value as
effectively as does a ban on activity already in progress.")).
101. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2000). For a taste of the cases addressing this issue see United
States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985); Palm Beach Isles Assocs. v.
United States, 231 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Florida Rock Industries,Inc. v. United States, 18
F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Loveladies Harbor,Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir.
1994); Bowles v. United States, 31 Fed. Cl. 37 (Fed. Cl. 1994).
102. E.g., Bowles, 31 Fed. Cl. at 44, 48-49 (finding that the denial of a section 404 permit
left a $70,000 lot essentially worthless). A drastic reduction in the value of property alone,
however, often will not constitute a taking. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438
U.S. 104, 131 (1978) (citing Euclid v. Ambler Reality Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (finding no
taking where a zoning law decreased the value of property by seventy-five percent);
Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1951) (finding no taking where an ordinance reduced
the value of an $800,000 plot of land to $60,000)). But see supra Part III.A. (discussing how
under the economic-impact test, courts have found that the total devaluation of property
alone is sufficient to constitute a taking. E.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003
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either prohibits a current use '°3 or appropriates property, ' owners
denied section 404 permits would have no cause of action. Although it
is generally agreed that there are some instances in which the property
owner will ultimately be without remedy,"5 it is also recognized that the
Takings Clause is "designed to bar Government from forcing some
people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice,
should be borne by the public as a whole."'°6 Thus, both logic and
justice support giving owners, whose property has arguably been
destroyed by state prohibition of a prospective use, the opportunity to
establish a taking. In practice, however, the judicial doctrine created to
address the validity of government prohibition of prospective useinvestment-backed expectations-is immersed in confusion and
ambiguity.
Exactly what is confusing about investment-backed expectations?
At the risk of giving the topic too cursory a review, it is necessary to
identify some of the problems associated with investment-backed
expectations. To begin, it is worth discussing the inconsistent manner in
which the doctrine of investment-backed expectations is applied."7
Next, an examination of the meaning of "investment-backed" will be
undertaken.' 8 Finally, there is a brief discussion of the likely impact the
Court's holding in Palazzolo will have on the investment-backed
expectations doctrine. 9
1. Investment-Backed Expectations as Applied
There is general confusion regarding how courts should apply the
(1992)).
103. See, e.g., Brace v. United States, 48 Fed. Cl. 271 (Fed. Cl. 2000) (challenging an
order to dismantle a drainage system and restore a wetland).
104. E.g., Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (holding that granting a building
permit on condition that the owner dedicate an easement to the public, allowing lateral beach
access, is a taking). Included in this category are permanent government intrusions into
private property. E.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419
(1982). A permanent intrusion into private property is merely a different form of direct
property appropriation for public use. See id.
105. E.g., Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029 (holding that compensation will be denied when the
government is abating a nuisance); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY
AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN, 112 (1985) ("Supreme Court cases have repeatedly
referred to control of nuisances as a proper end of the state, and there is no doubt today, as in
times past, that this proposition is sound in principle.").
106. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
107. See infra Part III.B.1.
108. See infra Part III.B.2.
109. See infra Part III.B.3.
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doctrine of investment-backed expectations. While some courts strictly

adhere to the theory that the doctrine of investment-backed
expectations is one consideration in a multi-factor test,"10 other courts
have regularly decided takings claims on this factor alone."' In addition,
a third category of courts use the doctrine of investment-backed
expectations as one prong of a two-prong test to determine whether or
not a regulation has denied a landowner of all economically viable use."2
110. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (stating that
the relevant factors in a takings analysis include "[t]he economic impact of the regulation on
the claimant and, particularly, the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct
investment-backed expectations," as well as "the character of the governmental action."
(citation omitted)). Many courts follow this multi-factor analysis. E.g., E. Enters. v. Apfel,
524 U.S. 498 (1998); Dist. Intown Props. Ltd. P'ship v. Dist. of Columbia, 198 F.3d 874, 88384 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Mekuria v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 975 F. Supp. 1, 5 (D.D.C.
1997); Rushton v. Saratoga Forest Prods., Inc., 172 B.R. 99, 101-03 (Bankr. D. Utah 1994);
Alexander Inv. v. United States, 51 Fed. Cl. 102, 108-10 (Fed. Cl. 2001); Paradissiotis v.
United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 16, 20-24 (Fed. Cl. 2001); see also infra note 122 (citing more
authority).
111. See, e.g., Good v. United States, 189 F.3d 1355, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1999) ("For any
regulatory takings claim to succeed, the claimant must show that the government's regulatory
restraint interfered with his investment-backed expectations in a manner that requires the
government to compensate him."); Coan v. Bernier, 176 B.R. 976, 990 (Bankr. D. Conn.
1995) (labeling investment-backed expectations, "the sine qua non of a taking"); Adamson v.
City of Provo, 819 F. Supp. 934, 953 (D. Utah 1993) (rejecting a takings claim because the
plaintiffs failed to allege interference with investment-backed expectations); Brace v. United
States, 51 Fed. Cl. 649, 651 (Fed. Cl. 2002) (referring to investment-backed expectations, the
court said, "The Supreme Court has implicitly recognized that the third Penn Central
criterion, by itself, may be determinative over a takings claim." (citing Good v. United States,
39 Fed. Cl. 81, 95 (1997), aff'd, 189 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). Palazzolo was reviewed by
the Supreme Court after the Rhode Island Supreme Court applied this dispositive. version of
the investment-backed expectations doctrine. Palazzolo v. State ex rel. Tavares, 746 A.2d 707,
717 (R.I. 2000). However, in her concurrence, Justice O'Connor warned against such an
application of the investment-backed expectations doctrine:
The court erred in elevating what it believed to be "[petitioner's] lack of reasonable
Investment-backed
investment-backed expectations" to "dispositive" status.
expectations, though important, are not talismanic under Penn Central. Evaluation
of the degree of interference with investment-backed expectations instead is one
factor that points toward the answer to the question whether the application of a
particular regulation to particular property "goes too far."
Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 634 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (alterati9 n in original) (citations
omitted); see also Radford & Breemer, supra note 100, at 480 (stating how recent "trends
have elevated expectations analysis from its initial place as one element in Penn Central's
multi-factor balancing test and converted it into something resembling a procedural bar");
infra notes 115-16 and accompanying text.
112. Reahard v. Lee County, 968 F.2d 1131, 1136 (11th Cir. 1992). The other prong of
this test is "the economic impact of the regulation on the claimant." Id.; accord Resolution
Trust Corp. v. Town of Highland Beach, 18 F.3d 1536, 1549 (11th Cir. 1994), vacated en banc,
42 F.3d 626 (11th Cir. 1994); New Port Largo, Inc. v. Monroe County, 873 F. Supp. 633, 642
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Which of the three investment-backed expectations analyses does the

Supreme Court endorse?
As it turns out, any of these applications of investment-backed
expectations may be correct depending upon which Justice's opinion
prevails. In Bowen v. Gilliard,"' Justice Stevens endorsed the rule that

investment-backed expectations are one consideration in a multi-factor
test.
Conversely, Justice Blackmun's opinion in Ruckelshaus v.
Monsanto Co.' is cited as the source of the proposition that takings
cases may be decided solely by considering investment-backed
expectations. 116 Meanwhile, Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Lucas
supports the two-prong test by indicating that investment-backed
expectations must be considered when determining whether or not a

regulation has stripped property of its value."' With so little guidance
from the Supreme Court, it is no surprise that the doctrine of
investment-backed expectations has been given such inconsistent
treatment by the lower courts.11

It has been no help that investment-backed expectations also have,
what one commentator has labeled, "murky" origins in case law." 9
Before Penn Central, "regulatory takings claims focused primarily on
factors such as the presence of a physical invasion, the diminution in

value of the property, and a determination of whether the regulation
was intended to prevent a harm or provide a benefit."'20 Investment(S.D. Fla. 1994). Interestingly, the Resolution Trust Court cited the Supreme Court's opinion
in Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587 (1986), for the proposition that investment-backed
expectations are one factor in a two-pronged economic viability test. Resolution Trust, 18
F.3d at 1549. The Bowen Court, however, does not employ such a rule. See generally Bowen,
483 U.S. 587. Instead, Bowen follows the multi-factor Penn Central test. Id. at 606-08; see
also infra note 122 and accompanying text.
113. 483 U.S. 587 (1986).
114. Id. at 606-08.
115. 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
116. Id. at 1005 (stating, in reference to investment-backed expectations, that the Court
"find[s] that the force of this factor is so overwhelming.., that it disposes of the taking
question."). For an example of how courts have used this statement to elevate the weight
given to investment-backed expectations, see Good, 39 Fed. Cl. at 95. See also discussion
supra note 111 (listing cases that have been decided soley on the investment-backed
expectation factor).
117. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1034 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
("Where a taking is alleged from regulations which deprive the property of all value, the test
must be whether the deprivation is contrary to reasonable, investment-backed
expectations.").
118. See supra notes 110-12.
119. Oswald, supra note 11, at 99.
120. Id. at 99-100.
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backed expectations did not become part of the takings analysis until
Penn Central, when Justice Brennan wrote, "[t]he economic impact of
the regulation on the claimant and, particularly, the extent to which the
regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations
are, of course, relevant considerations."''
There has been wide
recognition that Brennan's opinion in Penn Central stands for the

proposition that the ad hoc takings analysis includes three crucial
factors: (1) the economic impact of the regulation on the claimant, (2)
the interference with distinct (later defined as "reasonable")
investment-backed expectations, and (3) the character of the
governmental action.'22 There are two problems with this interpretation

of Penn Central worth closer scrutiny: (1) it has no support in case law,
and (2) it ignores Justice Brennan's exact words. Therefore, it is likely
that the prevailing interpretation of Penn Central overlooks the idea

Justice Brennan attempted to convey when he referred to investmentbacked expectations.
A close evaluation of Justice Brennan's language reveals that,
contrary to popular interpretation, he did not write "[t]he economic
impact of the regulation on the claimant and the extent to which the
regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations
are, of course, relevant considerations."' This interpretation omits the
word "particularly.' ' 24 According to both Webster's and The Oxford
121. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). The other
oft-cited Penn Central factor "is the character of the governmental action." Id.
122. See id. Judges and scholars alike have interpreted Penn Central as establishing this
three factor balancing test. E.g., Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 633-34 (2001); TahoeSierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'I Planning Agency, 216 F.3d 764, 772 (9th Cir. 2000);
Palm Beach Isles Assocs. v. United States, 231 F.3d 1354, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Matagorda
County v. Law, 19 F.3d 215, 223 (5th Cir. 1994); Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28
F.3d 1171, 1176 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Fla. Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 18 F.3d 1560, 1564
(Fed. Cir. 1994); Wash. Legal Found. v. Tex. Equal Access to Justice Found., 86 F. Supp. 624,
643 (W.D. Tex. 2000); Unity Real Estate Co. v. Hudson, 889 F. Supp. 818, 826 (W.D. Pa.
1995); Naegele Outdoor Adver., Inc. v. City of Durham, 803 F. Supp. 1068, 1074 (M.D.N.C.
1992); Brace v. United States, 48 Fed. Cl. 271, 278 (Fed. Cl. 2000); Douglas T. Kendall &
Charles P. Lord, The Takings Project: A CriticalAnalysis and Assessment of the Progress So
Far,25 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 509,518 (1998); Oswald, supra note 11, at 104; Courtney C.
Tedrowe, ConceptualSeverance and Takings in the Federal Circuit, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 586,
601 (2000); William W. Wade, Penn Central's Economic Failings Confounded Takings
Jurisprudence,31 URB. LAW. 277, 277 (1999); see also discussion supra Part lI.B.
123. See Penn Cent.Trans. Co., 438 U.S. at 124 (1978).
124. Justice Brennan actually wrote, "[t]he economic impact of the regulation on the
claimant and, particularly, the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct
investment-backed expectations are, of course, relevant considerations." Id. at 124 (emphasis
added). Most courts and commentators omit the word "particularly" from the Penn Central
holding. See supra note 122. Of the sources cited in note 122, only two retained the word

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[86:617

Dictionary, "particularly" means "specifically."'2

If Justice Brennan

meant "particularly" as a synonym of "specifically," his famous
statement would read, "[t]he economic impact of the regulation on the

claimant and [specifically] the extent to which the regulation has
interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations are, of course,
relevant considerations."
Under such a reading it becomes clear that Justice Brennan was not
proposing two separate and distinct factors. Rather, by this reading, he
proposed one broad factor-the economic impact of the regulation on
the claimant-under which there exist multiple considerations.

Chief

among these economic considerations is interference with distinct
investment-backed expectations. 26' In other words, Justice Brennan was
saying that economic impact is an important factor in a regulatory
takings analysis, but when courts evaluate economic impact they should
consider the investment-backed expectations of the claimant.
Such an interpretation of investment-backed expectations is
consistent with the doctrine's design: to evaluate the validity of
"particularly." Wade, supra note 122, at 277; Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 633. Numerous
Commentators quoting Justice Brennan made this telling alteration: "'[T]he economic impact
of the regulation on the claimant and ... , the extent to which the regulation has interfered
with distinct investment-backed expectations .... "' E.g., Oswald, supra note 11, at 104
(omitting only the word "particularly").
125. MERRIAM WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 847 (10th ed. 1993); THE
OXFORD DESK DICTIONARY AND THESAURUS 574 (Am. ed. 1997).
126. Paradissiotis v. United States, 49 Fed Cl. 16, 20 n.4 (Fed. Cl. 2001). Judge Futey
discusses the misinterpretation of Penn Central in a footnote:
It is clear that these factors as first described in Penn Central Transportation were
not divided into three parts, but two. The test consisted of the "economic impact"
and "character" factors, of which the "economic impact" factor had a further, more
specific part:... "investment-backed expectations".... The use of "particularly"
indicates that the "'reasonable expectation" factor of the test is a subsection of the
overall economic impact analysis, and not a stand-alone factor. Thus, the Supreme
Court explained that a proper analysis of the economic impact in a regulatory
takings case would include consideration of the diminution of the known, present
value of property as well as the expectations of value based on the development or
intended use of the property. Subsequent Supreme Court cases, however, have
divided the "economic impact" language from the "reasonable expectations"
language, creating a new factor. See, e.g., Connolly, 475 U.S. at 225, 106 S.Ct. 1018;
Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1005, 104 S.Ct. 2862; PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins,
447 U.S. 74, 83, 100 S.Ct. 2035, 64 L.Ed.2d 741 (1980); Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 175,
100 S.Ct. 383. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has
adopted this three- factor test, see, e.g., 767 Third Ave., 48 F.3d at 1580, despite the
test's likely alteration of the analysis required in determining regulatory takings.
This court will therefore apply the same test. See Rockefeller, 32 Fed.Cl. at 591.
Paradissiotis,49 Fed Cl. at 20 n.4.
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government prohibition on the prospective use of property.27 This
interpretation-that investment-backed expectations are merely part of
the larger analysis of economic impact-is also consistent with Justice
Brennan's application of the doctrine. In his discussion of investmentbacked expectations,'28 Justice Brennan claims that the leading authority
for this doctrine is Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.'29 As at least one
scholar has noted, "nowhere in that case does the phrase 'investmentbacked expectations' appear."'30
While at a glance this may be interpreted as a mistake or an attempt
to be deliberately misleading on Justice Brennan's part, such a negative
interpretation is unwarranted when investment-backed expectations are
considered as just one element of a broad economic impact analysis.
Discussing the Court's holding in Mahon, Justice Brennan wrote, "[T]he
statute made it commercially impracticable to mine the coal and thus
had nearly the same effect as the complete destruction of rights the
claimant had reserved from the owners of the surface land ....
Phrasing this another way, Justice Brennan claimed that the statute
interfered with the expectations of the coal company-expectations
flowing from rights the coal company had safeguarded from the owners
of the surface. One result of the statutory interference with the coal
company's expectations was that the statute made it "commercially
impracticable to mine the coal."' 32 Because coal that cannot be mined is
worthless, the interference with mining expectations completely
devalued the coal company's property. Hence, under Mahon, the
economic impact-prong of Justice Brennan's two-prong analysis'33 was
satisfied.
Interpreting investment-backed expectations as one element in a
broad economic impact consideration solves both of the previously
mentioned problems: 34 (1) it has support in case law prior to Penn
Central and (2) it is consistent with Justice Brennan's language. In
addition, whereas the courts currently disagree on how to apply

127. See Michelman, supra note 13, at 1233; Radford & Breemer, supra note 100, at 454;
discussion supra Part III.B.
128. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 127 (1978).
129. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
130. Oswald, supranote 11, at 100.
131. Penn Cent. Trans. Co., 438 U.S. at 127 (citation omitted).
132. Id.
133. The other prong "is the character of the governmental action." Id. at 124.
134. See discussion supra text accompanying notes 122-23.
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investment-backed expectations,'35 adopting this interpretation would
aid in clarifying the doctrine. Only during an economic impact analysis
should investment-backed expectations be considered.
2. The Meaning of "Investment-Backed"
A second controversy associated with investment-backed
expectations, though admittedly of much smaller concern than how to
apply the doctrine, is the meaning of "investment-backed." The
Palazzolo Court recognized that there are some situations in which the
owners will have acquired regulated property by some means other than
purchase.'36 Obviously, in these situations it would be difficult for an
owner to argue that the regulated property interest is "investmentbacked." Do these owners, whose property interest is the result of a
gift, devise, or inheritance, have valid claims against the state for
interfering with prospective uses?
Like the different signals the Court has sent regarding how to apply
the doctrine of investment-backed expectations, 37 the Court has also
provided inconsistent guidance on the meaning of "investment-backed."
Justice O'Connor downplayed the need for investment-backing in her
Palazzolo concurrence by stating that the Court has "never held that a
takings claim is defeated simply on account of the lack of a personal
13
8
financial investment by a postenactment acquirer of property."'
However, in Hodel v. Irving'39 Justice O'Connor implied that
investment-backing is required for Fifth Amendment protection of
prospective uses.'40 The issue in Hodel was whether the "escheat"
provision of the Indian Land Consolidation Act of 1983-created as a
solution to the fractionalization of Indian lands-effects a taking
without just compensation."' In commenting on the fact that appellees'
135. See supra notes 110-12 and accompanying text.
136. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 627 (2001); id. at 634-35 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (citing Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 714-18 (1987)).
137. See discussion supra Part III.B.1.
138. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 635 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
139. 481 U.S. 704 (1987).
140. Id. at 714-15. Since the constitutionality of government abrogation of both the
right to pass property through descent and devise is at issue, Justice O'Connor actually
addresses whether investment-backing is required for constitutional protection of prospective
property dispositions. See generally id.; see also Oswald, supra note 11, at 116 (suggesting that
the Hodel Court meant "to indicate that expectations that would be protected if they were
investment-backed will not be protected if the owner received them through gift, inheritance,
or devise[.]").
141. Hodel, 481 U.S. at 704-09.
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decedents "overwhelmingly acquired [their property] by gift, descent, or
devise," Justice O'Connor noted that "[t]he extent to which any of
appellees' decedents had 'investment-backed expectations' in passing on
the property is dubious."" 2 Scholars and courts alike have interpreted
this statement as removing unpurchased property from the
constitutional protection of the Takings Clause.
As one author noted, such a proposition "leads to a ludicrous
outcome .... Constitutional protection of property does not, and should

not, depend upon either the unilateral actions of the property owner or

the manner in which the property was acquired. ,14 While "investment-

backed" may be an accurate description of the expectations claimants
regularly possess in takings challenges, there should be no requirement
that the claimants purchased these expectations. The only requirement
should be that a claimant's expectations regarding the property be
objectively reasonable.'45
A good illustration of why the only requirement should be that the

expectations be objectively reasonable is found in Loveladies Harbor,
Inc. v. United States.'

This case also serves as an example of how a

court applied investment-backed expectations along the parameters
discussed by Justice O'Connor in Hodel 47 According to the opinion,
investment-backed expectations analysis provides "a way of limiting
takings recoveries to owners who could demonstrate that they bought
their property in reliance on a state of affairs that did not include the

142. Id. at 715. Ultimately, the Court found the "escheat" provision unconstitutional
under a different Penn Central factor-" the character of the Government regulation here is
extraordinary." Id. at 716.
143. See, e.g., Whitehorse v. Babbit, 918 F. Supp. 274, 280 (W.D. Wis. 1996); Oswald,
supra note 11, at 116.
144. Oswald, supra note 11, at 117.
145. Although there was some initial controversy over whether the investment-backed
expectations doctrine was designed as a subjective or an objective standard, ever since the
term "distinct," used in describing the expectations, was replaced by the term "reasonable" in
Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979), there has been a gradual shift towards
a general recognition that investment-backed expectations is an objective standard. Radford
& Breemer, supra note 100, at 460; see also Elias v. Town of Brookhaven, 783 F. Supp. 758,
761 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) ("To establish a 'taking' it is, of course, not enough to show a subjective
expectation of making a profit or even of recovering all of one's investment. The test must be
an objective one."); Oswald, supra note 11, at 107 ("The Court has replaced its original
reference to 'distinct' investment-backed expectations in Penn Central with the term
'reasonable' investment-backed expectations [in subsequent cases], suggesting that the
owner's expectations should be gauged by some objective standard.").
146. 28 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
147. See supra notes 139-42 and accompanying text.
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challenged regulatory regime.'"' 8 Following this theory to a logical
conclusion, if two owners-one who purchased her land and the other
who received his land through inheritance-possess identical swamps in
identical neighborhoods and the State subsequently prohibits the
development of swamps, only the owner who purchased her property is
entitled to recovery. Obviously, this should not be the result; both
owners should be entitled to the same recovery or lack thereof because
both of their property interests have been equally affected.
Instead of evaluating how the owners acquired their property, a
proper expectations analysis should ask, "would reasonable owners in
these owners' position have a reasonable expectation to use the
property in a way now regulated?" Applying the investment-backed
expectations doctrine in this fashion results in a consistent recovery for
the owners wishing to develop their swamps. Under such a "reasonable
expectations" interpretation, the doctrine of "investment-backed
expectations" is a misnomer. Investment has no role in a reasonable
expectations analysis.
3. Palazzolo: The Future of the Doctrine of Investment-Backed
Expectations
A third problem with the investment-backed expectations doctrine is
that Palazzolo further muddles the doctrine because it establishes the
right of property owners to challenge regulations enacted prior to their
ownership. 4'19 Before Palazzolo, it was widely accepted that when a land
purchase was made, the owner took title subject to whatever land-use
restrictions existed. 5 ' Accordingly, any regulations would be reflected
148. Loveladies, 28 F.3d at 1177. Judge Plager, writing for the court, appears to apply a
He stated: "With regard to...
subjective investment-backed expectations standard.
investment-backed expectations it is not disputed that Loveladies purchased the land
involved with the reasonable expectation and intention of developing it-over time for sale to
" Id. at 1179.
purchasers of the improved lots ....
149. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 626-30 (2001).
150. See, e.g., Loveladies, 28 F.3d at 1177 (stating that "the owner who bought with
knowledge of the restraint could be said to have no reliance interest, or to have assumed the
risk of any economic loss."); Michelman, supra note 13, at 1238; see also Naegele Outdoor
Adver., Inc. v. City of Durham, 803 F. Supp. 1068, 1079 (M.D.N.C. 1992) (quoting Claridge v.
N.H. Wetlands Bd., 485 A.2d 287,291 (N.H. 1984)). The Claridge court stated:
"A person who purchases land with notice of statutory impediments to the right to
develop that land can justify few, if any, legitimate investment-backed expectations
of development rights which rise to the level of constitutionally protected property
rights.., the state cannot be the guarantor by inverse condemnation proceedings, of
the investment risk which people choose to take in the face of statutory or
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in the purchase price.'

Thus, it was believed, new owners were

prohibited from bringing takings challenges because they had notice of
52
the limitations and, consequently, suffered no loss.
Palazzolo rejects this argument because of the unfairness inherent in
denying property owners the "right to challenge unreasonable
limitations on the use and value of [their] land."'53 If the Court had
followed the reasoning presented by the State of Rhode Island,' it
would have effectively amounted to "an expiration date on the Takings
Clause." 5 Although the Court properly recognized that a regulation
that deprives an owner of a property right should be able to be

challenged as unconstitutional, regardless of when the regulation was
enacted, the Court is expressly divided on the role this holding should
play in a takings analysis.'56
Justices O'Connor and Breyer argued that it is proper to consider
existing regulations on a property at the time of acquisition to determine
the buyer's reasonable investment-backed expectations.' Justice Scalia,
however, claimed "that a restriction exist[ing] at the time the purchaser
took title... should have no bearing upon the determination of whether
the restriction is so substantial as to constitute a taking."'58 In addition,

Justice Stevens argued that while subsequent owners may challenge
unreasonable land-use regulations, they are not entitled to
compensation because a taking is a "discrete event."5

9

Instead, "it is the

person who owned the property at the time of the taking that is entitled
regulatory impediments."
Id.; Coan v. Bernier, 176 B.R. 976, 991-92 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1995) (citing and following
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1006-07 (1984), for the proposition that no
reasonable investment-backed expectations can exist where a regulation, in effect before the
property's acquisition, limits the owner's rights); see also supra note 13 (citing additional
authority for this proposition). Contra Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 64--65 n.21 (1979)
("The timing of acquisition of the [property] is relevant to a takings analysis of appellees'
investment-backed expectations, but it does not erect a jurisdictional obstacle at the
threshold."); Oswald, supra note 11, at 122 ("the timing of the property owner's acquisition of
the property at stake is irrelevant to the determination of whether the regulation effects a
taking.").
151. Michelman, supra note 13, at 1238.
152. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 626.
153. Id. at 627.
154. See supra text accompanying notes 150-52.
155. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 627.
156. See generallyid.
157. Id. at 632-36 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 654-55 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
158. Id. at 637 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
159. Id. at 638 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[86:617

to the recovery., 16 If the concurring and dissenting opinions in
Palazzolo are any indication of what is to come, the doctrine of
expectations is bound to become even further
investment-backed
1 61
fractured.
C. Nuisance: Living Up to Its Name
A nuisance has been defined as "an unreasonable interference with
the use or enjoyment of land.' ' 162 Although this definition may appear
straightforward, the role of nuisance in the takings doctrine, at least with
respect to regulations that deny an owner all economically viable use of
his land, is considerably more complicated. In a Lucas analysis,
unreasonable interference alone will not qualify as a nuisance; for a
nuisance to fit within the nuisance exception to a regulatory taking, the
state "must identify background principles of nuisance.., that prohibit
the uses [the landowner] intends in the circumstances in which the
property is presently found."' 63 To clarify his point, Justice Scalia also
stated that "[t]he fact that a particular use has long been engaged in by
similarly situated owners ordinarily imports a lack of any common-law
prohibition.... So also does the fact that other landowners, similarly
situated, are permitted to continue the use denied to the claimant." 164
Despite noting that "changed circumstances or new knowledge may
make what was once previously permissible no longer so,"' 6 Justice
Scalia rejected with little consideration the possibility that any new
knowledge would render coastal development a nuisance noting that
"[i]t seems unlikely that common-law principles would have prevented
the erection of any habitable or productive improvements on
petitioner's land."'66 Justice Stevens aptly pointed out that this holding
"effectively freezes the State's common law, denying the legislature
power to revise the law governing the rights and
much of its traditional
67
"1
property.
of
uses
This narrow application of the nuisance doctrine has two significant
shortcomings. First, it denies the ability of the nuisance doctrine to
160. Id. at 639.
161. See supra notes 158-61 and accompanying text.
162. J. GORDON HYLTON ET AL., PROPERTY LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 92

(1998).
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1031 (1992).
Id.
Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 827 cmt. g (1979)).
Id.
dissenting).
Id. at 1068-69 (Stevens, J.,
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change with time. As Justice Stevens correctly argued, legislatures have

throughout history played an important role in determining what
constitutes a nuisance.'
Nuisance, itself, has always been a dynamic
doctrine and has been characterized as the product of "our ongoing selfeducation."'69 Even though Scalia expressly recognized the dynamic
character of the nuisance doctrine, 70 his emphasis on common-law
principles when applying the doctrine' resulted in ignoring any
nuisance that was not a recognized nuisance at some point in the past.'

Second, determining the status of the nuisance doctrine in the past
may be problematic. "'There is perhaps no more impenetrable jungle in

the entire law than that which surrounds the word 'nuisance.' It has
meant all things to all people, and has been applied indiscriminately to
everything from an alarming advertisement to a cockroach baked in a
pie.'""'

Nonetheless, Justice Scalia apparently believes that when a

state regulation deprives a' property owner of all economically viable
use, the logical and just way to determine if the Takings Clause requires
compensation is to send lawyers, law clerks, and judges alike, on a wildgoose-chase through nineteenth-century reporters. Surely the Takings
Clause does not require such absurd results.
IV. PROPERTY OWNERSHIP AS CLAIMS, PRIVILEGES, POWERS, AND
DUTIES

Although there is general agreement that the law of regulatory

168. Id.; see also, e.g., Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887). Mugler is one of many
cases in which a takings challenge was rejected based on a legislative determination that the
restricted use was a nuisance. Id. In Mugler, the court agreed that a regulation prohibiting
the manufacture and sale of alcohol, effectively depriving Muglar of any economically viable
use of his property, was a valid exercise of the State's police power because it abated a
nuisance. Id.
169. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1069 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also HYLTON, supra note 162,
at 98 (comparing Wescott v. Middleton, 11 A. 490 (N.J. 1887) (holding that funeral parlors in
residential neighborhoods are not nuisances) with Powell v. Taylor, 263 S.W.2d 906 (Ark.
1954) (holding that funeral parlors in residential neighborhoods are nuisances)).
170. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1031; see also supra text accompanying note 165.
171. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1031.
172. See discussion infra Part IV.B (explaining how the problems of applying an
uncertain nuisance standard from the past is remedied by evaluating property "rights" with
Hohfeld's legal concepts); Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1055 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (questioning
why Scalia believes "judges in the 18th and 19th centuries can distinguish a harm from a
benefit, [but] judges [and legislators] in the 20th century [cannot];" and observing, "[t]here is
nothing magical in the reasoning of judges long dead.").
173. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1055 n.19 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting W. KEETON ET
AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 616 (5th ed. 1984)).
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takings deserves serious reconsideration, there is no consensus on the
appropriate remedy."' No doubt, much of the discontent with the
current takings doctrine stems from the problems with the doctrine set
forth in Part III.' Thus, any theory resolving the shortcomings of the
takings doctrine must address the following three problems: (1) the
inconsistency between the economic-impact test and the harm
principle;"' (2) the confusion and inconsistency encountered by those
applying the doctrine of investment-backed expectations;' 77 and (3) the
obstacles bound to confront courts attempting to apply Lucas's arcane
version of the nuisance doctrine. 7 1 In addition, given the land-use
problems humanity is bound to face in the twenty-first century-as our
world becomes increasingly populated while our natural resources are
rapidly depleted-for any takings doctrine to realize longevity, it

necessarily requires flexibility. A theory based loosely on Wesley
Hohfeld's'79 explanations of legal rights can provide this flexibility while
at the same time simplifying the application of the problematic
principles previously mentioned. A brief review of Hohfeld's relevant
concepts provides a foundation for this discussion.

174. See, e.g., Rubenfeld, supra note 5, at 1081 ("I have not encountered a single lawyer,
judge, or scholar who views existing case-law as anything but a chaos of confused argument
which ought to be set right if one only knew how.') (quoting BRUCE A. ACKERMAN,
PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 8 (1977)).
175. See supra Part III.
176. See supra Part III.A.
177. See supra Part III.B.
178. See supra Part III.C.
179. Wesley Hohfeld was a Professor of Law at Stanford University and later accepted
an offer to teach at Yale. WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL
CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN JUDICIAL REASONING vii (Walter Wheeler Cook ed., 1964).
In 1913, Hohfeld wrote an article entitled Fundamental Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning, published by the Yale Law Journal. Id. In this article, Hohfeld used ordinary
words to identify and distinguish "eight concepts ... found in the minds and writings of every
judge and of every man capable of thought." Id. at viii. He did this to bring clarity to the
language, "forcing a judge or other user to have a clear and definite meaning (thought,
concept) and to choose the one word that would convey that exact meaning to another
person." Id. Furthermore, "he grouped the eight terms into pairs of 'correlatives' and
'opposites."' Id. at viii-ix. Hohfeld's analysis was not designed "as a method of determining
social and legal policy." Id. at xi. Rather, Hohfeld created his concepts to be used as tools to
help clarify issues. Id.; see also id. at 26 (stating in his own words that "the main purpose of
[his article] is to emphasize certain oft-neglected matters that may aid in the understanding
and in the solution of practical, everyday problems of the law."). Although Hohfeld died in
1918, at the mere age of 38, his writings were an important influence on the American Law
Institute's Restatement of the Law of Property. Id. at xi-xiv.
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A. Hohfeld's Explanation of Legal Rights
Hohfeld recognized that interests commonly described as "rights"

are really a cluster of legal concepts.l" Hohfeld identified eight
"fundamental" concepts he believed expressed "vitally important legal
relations of men with each other."18 As an aid to understanding these
concepts, Hohfeld presented a scheme exhibiting how these eight
fundamental concepts are related as "opposites" and "correlatives:"
fright (claim)

privilege

power

immunity

Iduty

no-right

liability

disability

(right (claim)

privilege

power

immunity

(no-right

duty

disability

liability182

Correlatives

Opposites

Thereafter, Hohfeld distinguished the eight concepts from one
another."3
A "right" is defined as "a legally enforceable claim of one person
against another, that the other shall do a given act or shall not do a given
act."184 This definition of "right" is limited to those concepts for which
there is a correlative duty." For example, if A has a right against B that
B shall stay off of A's land, B has a correlative duty to stay off A's
land." 6 To avoid confusion with the ordinary use of "right," Hohfeld
said "claim" could be used as an adequate synonym. This Comment will
use "claim" as a synonym for Hohfeld's "right," and continue to use
"right" in the ordinary sense of the term.1 87
In addition to claims and duties, Hohfeld also distinguished
"privileges" and their correlative, "no-rights.""
A "privilege" is
defined as "a legal freedom on the part of one person as against another

180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

Id. at 36;

PERRY,

HOHFELD,

supra note 15, at 41-42.

supra note 179, at viii.

Id. at 36. (chart as it appears in the original).
at 36-64.
See generally id.
RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 1 (1936).
HOHFELD, supra note 179, at 38.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 38-39.

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[86:617

to do a given act or a legal freedom not to do a given act." 89 Returning
to the previous example, if A has a claim against B that B stay off of A's
land, A has the privilege of entering the land.' 9 Privilege is the exact
opposite of duty."' Thus, another way of saying that A has a privilege of
entering the land is to say that A does not have a duty to stay off of the
land. 92 B has a correlative no-right, meaning that B has no claim that A
not enter.9 However, B's no-right does not mean that B owes a duty to
A; in fact, B may interfere with the exercise of A's privilege.'
A "power" is defined as "an ability on the part of a person to
produce a change in a given legal relation by doing or not doing a given
act. "' 9 For example, A has the power to transfer his land to B.' 96 If B
has the power to transfer A's land to a third party, A has a correlative
liability concerning his interest in the land.' 97 An "immunity" is defined
as "a freedom on the part of one person against having a given legal
relation altered by a given act or omission to act on the part of another
person.""' In the example, A, the landowner, has immunity against B
that B not transfer A's land.' 99 In other words, B has a correlative
disability to change A's legal interest in A's land."
When analyzing a property interest with these concepts in mind, it is
apparent that ownership amounts to a bundle of rights."' To articulate
the bundle of rights, it is worth considering one of Hohfeld's examples:
A is fee-simple owner of Blackacre....

First, A has ... claims,

that others, respectively, shall not enter on the land, that they
shall not cause physical harm to the land, etc., such others being
under respective correlative legal duties. Second, A has an
indefinite number of legal privileges of entering on the land,
189. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 2 (1936).
190. HOHFELD, supra note 179, at 39.
191. Id. at 38.
192. Id. at 39.
193. Id. Of the eight legal concepts Hohfeld identified and distinguished, this is the only
term he coined, noting that there was "no single term available to express [this] concept[]."
Id.
194. Perry, supra note 15, at 42.
195. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 3 (1936).
196. HOHFELD, supra note 179, at 51.
197. Id. at 36.
198. RESTATEMENT OFPROPERTY § 4 (1936).
199. HOHFELD, supra note 179, at 60.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 96.
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using the land, harming the land, etc., that is, within limits fixed
by law on grounds of social and economic policy, he has
privileges of doing on or to the land what he pleases; and
correlative to all such legal privileges are the respective legal norights of other persons. Third, A has the legal power to alienate
his legal interest to another ....Correlative to all such legal
powers are the legal liabilities in other persons .... Fourth, A
has an indefinite number of legal immunities .... A has the
immunity that no ordinary person can alienate A's legal
interest... ; the immunity that no ordinary person can extinguish
A's own privileges of using the land; the immunity that no
ordinary person can extinguish A's right that another person X
shall not enter on the land or, in other words, create in X a
privilege of entering on the land. Correlative to all these
immunities are the respective legal disabilities of other persons in
general.
With Hohfeld's legal concepts in mind, what sense can be made of the
takings doctrine?
B. Applying Hohfeld's Fundamental Concepts to Takings
When applying Hohfeld's concepts to a takings analysis, the
threshold question is: What type of right is interfered with? If a "claim"
is interfered with, a taking has occurred because the correlative right of
an owner's claim is the duty non-owners have with respect to that
claim.23 If the state violates this duty, the property owner is entitled to
compensation regardless of the economic impact that interference has
on the property at issue.
A number of property rights fall into the "claim" category including
2
the right to exclude and the right to be free from physical harm. 0 The
law supports these claims by recognizing owners' rights to exclude non20
205
owners and by permitting inverse condemnation actions. In addition
202. Id. at 96-97.
203. See id. and accompanying text.
204. See id. and accompanying text.
205. HYLTON, supra note 162, at 69 ("[C]haracteriz[ing] the 'right to exclude' as
'universally held to be a fundamental property right'" (quoting Justice Holmes in Pa. Coal
Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922)) and describing the right to exclude "as 'implicit in the
basic conception of private property"' (quoting EPSTEIN, supra note 105, at 63)); see also
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617 (2001) (stating that when "the government
encroaches upon or occupies private land for its own proposed use" a taking has occurred);
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 427 (1982) (holding that
even a slight "permanent physical occupation" of private land by the sovereign qualifies for
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to these two claims, the right to possess qualifies as a claim as well. 2
While claims are commonly infringed upon in cases of physical
occupation or actual takings,"8 these rights are not typically at issue in a
regulatory takings case.
If the government interferes with a power, it also exceeds a valid
exercise of authority. In property law, there exists at least one power:
the power to dispose."9 The Supreme Court affirmed the legitimacy of
this power in Hodel v. Irving210 by striking down a statute that abrogated
the right to dispose of property by will or intestate succession.2 ' In
applying Hohfeld's legal concepts, the same conclusion is reached
because the correlative right of the owner's power is the liability nonowners have concerning the property.2' The government is at the mercy
of the owner to have the legal relation between the owner and the
property changed.2"3 Thus, if the state interferes with a property owner's
power without paying compensation, the state has done so in violation
of the Takings Clause. Like claims, however, powers are also not
normally at issue in regulatory takings cases.
If it is found that the government has interfered with neither a claim
nor a power, it must be determined whether either a privilege or a duty
is subject to interference. This determination is the essence of most
regulatory takings inquiries. This is because the overwhelming majority
of regulatory takings cases involve government interference with a
current or proposed use.214 Although other privileges exist, such as an
owner's privilege to enter her land,2"5 the privilege to use the land is
most often subjected to government regulation.
compensation). However, the right to exclude does have limits. See, e.g., Ploof v. Putnam, 71
A. 188 (Vt. 1908) (holding that necessity is an exception to the right to exclude).
206. E.g., Palm Beach County v. Tessler, 538 So. 2d 846 (Fla. 1989).
207. E.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994) (finding a taking where the city
granted a development permit on condition that the property owner dedicate ten percent of
her land to the city for use as a pedestrian or bicycle pathway).
208. E.g., Loretto, 458 U.S. at 419.
209. See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
210. 481 U.S. 704 (1987).
211. Id.
212. See discussion supraPart IV.A.
213. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 3 cmt. a (1936).
214. For example, cases addressing the denial of section 404 permits under the Clean
Water Act. See United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985); Palm
Beach Isles Assocs. v.,United States, 231 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Loveladies Harbor, Inc.
v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Fla. Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 18 F.3d
1560 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Bowles v. United States, 31 Fed. Cl. 37 (Fed. Cl. 1994).
215. See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
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The determination of whether it is a privilege or a duty that is
regulated is necessary even though -privileges do not have a correlative
duty"6 or a guarantee to be free from interference.1 7 This determination
is required because the government does not have unbridled reign to
regulate privileges. There is a limitation on the government in the form
of a disability; property owners have immunity from having their
privileges extinguished.21s The government's correlative disability
prohibits it from extinguishing an owner's privilege.1 9 Therefore, if a
regulation extinguishes an owner's privilege, the Takings Clause has
again been violated.
The privilege to use-manifested in various ways-is qualified by
"limits fixed by law on grounds of social and economic policy."2 " These
limits are the claims third persons have against the property owners to
" ' One example is nuisance; third persons have claims
do or to forbear.22
against a property owner to forbear from being a nuisance.222 The
nuisance.2 3
correlative right of the property owner is the duty not to be a
Distinguishing between where a privilege ends and where a duty
begins, however, can prove to be a difficult task. Under Hohfeld's
scheme of legal concepts, privilege is the opposite of duty.22 To define
2
"duty," Hohfeld quotes Lake Shore & M.S.R. Co. v. Kurtz: ' "'A duty

or a legal obligation is that which one ought or ought not to do.' 226 This
definition bears a close resemblance to the duty standard currently used
in tort-whenever a reasonable person of ordinary prudence
"reasonably foresee[s] that his conduct will involve an unreasonable risk
of harm to other[s] ...he is then under a duty to them to exercise the

care of a reasonable person as to what he does or does not do." 227 So it
follows that to distinguish between privileges and duties, courts need
only apply the same duty standard established in tort law.
216. HOHFELD, supra note 179, at 41; see also discussion supra Part IV.A.
217. HOHFELD, supra note 179, at 41.

218. Id. at 97; see also supra note 202 and accompanying text.
219. See discussion supra Part IV.A.
220. HOHFELD, supra note 179, at 96.
221. See discussion supra Part IV.A.
222. See discussion supra Part III.C.
223. See discussion supraPart IV.A.
224. Id.
225. 37 N.E. 303 (Ind. 1894).
226. HOHFELD, supra note 179, at 38 (quoting Lake Shore & M.S.R. Co. v. Kurtz, 37
N.E. 303,304 (1894)).
227. VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ ET AL., PROSSER, WADE AND SCHWARTZ'S TORTS 398
(10th ed. 2000).
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The adoption of the tort law duty standard to determine duties in
regulatory takings cases has multiple benefits. First, judges, lawyers,
and legislators are well-versed in this familiar standard. As a result,
much of the confusion associated with the current takings doctrine
would be alleviated. Second, this standard would effectively eliminate
the conflict between the economic-impact test and the harm principle."8
Some critics are certain to argue that, although the tort standard of duty
does resolve the conflict, the standard resolves the inconsistency
decidedly in favor of the harm principle. Granted, this duty standard
incorporates much of the harm principle, but it must not be forgotten
that even the relatively stringent application of the economic-impact test
in Lucas incorporates elements of the harm principle by way of the
nuisance exception.229 In addition, Justice Scalia recognized another
regulatory taking exception-background principles of state property
law-that further evidences flaws in a pure economic-impact analysis.23'
With these two Lucas exceptions in mind, it can hardly be argued that
the economic-impact test did not already yield to the harm principle.
Adopting the duty standard would simply affirm that the state may
''prevent ...[an] owner from making a use which interferes with
231
paramount rights of the public. ,
A third benefit, closely related to the second, is that the duty
standard would eliminate any need to apply the arcane doctrine of
nuisance. 21' Rather than requiring the courts to dust off old texts in an
attempt to decipher what constituted an unreasonable use of property in
a time long past, finders of fact operating under the tort standard of duty
would be allowed, even encouraged, to consider humanity's "ongoing
self-education" in arriving at their conclusions."J This flexibility is
imperative because there is near universal recognition that "changed
circumstances or new knowledge may make what was previously
permissible no longer so" or vice-versa."'
Returning to the takings determination, if it is found that an owner's
228. See discussion supra Part III.A.
229. Id.
230. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1031 (1992). In Lucas the Court
stated that to qualify as a "background principle" of property law, the State "must do more
than proffer the legislature's declaration that the uses Lucas desires are inconsistent with the
public interest, or [make a] conclusory assertion that they violate a common-law maxim." Id.
231. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,417 (1922) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
232. See discussion supra Part III.C.
233. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1069 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
234. Id. at 1031 (Scalia, J., writing for the majority).
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duty is regulated, no taking has occurred because the regulation is
merely a legal exercise of the correlative public claim against the
owner.235 Conversely, if the property owner is found to have no duty
regarding the regulated activity, it is a privilege that must be the subject
of regulation because privilege is the opposite of duty. 6 Alteration and
diminution of privileges are generally permissible because the holders of
the correlative "no-rights" are not prohibited from interfering with
property privileges. 7 When a property-use regulation extinguishes an
owner's privilege to use, however, the state has exceeded its authority
because property owners have immunity from having their privilege to
use extinguished. 8 The government's correlative disability prohibits it
from extinguishing an owner's privilege to use without compensation.239
To determine whether or not an owner's privilege to use has been
extinguished, there must be a common definition of "extinguish."
Obviously, a standard requiring all use to be eliminated is unduly harsh
on the property owner. Even the most stringent regulation will always
leave some use to the owner, albeit likely that the reserved use is
impractical.24 A better standard is one that, like the standard for duty,
focuses on reasonableness; "' that is, would a reasonable owner have a
reasonable use for the property? If it is found that a reasonable owner
would have no reasonable use for the property, the privilege to use has
been extinguished thus indicating a taking has occurred.
The proposed regulatory takings standard both simplifies the law
and provides for flexibility. Flexibility goes hand-in-hand with the duty
standard. As knowledge increases, so does the recognition that certain
property uses may create an unreasonable risk of harm to other's person
or property. Likewise, knowledge may also result in the abolition of
certain ownership duties currently recognized. The standard simplifies
regulatory takings by accommodating practitioners and courts with
familiar tools. Both "duty" and the concept of "the reasonable person"
are well known to the law.
In addition, the standard simplifies the law by requiring the parties
235. See discussion supra Part IV.A.
236. Id.
237. HOHFELD, supra note 179, at 41; see also discussion supra Part IV.A.
238. HOHFELD, supra note 179, at 97; see also supra note 202 and accompanying text.
239. See discussion supra Part IV.A.
240. For example, there was probably no regulation preventing the Pennsylvania Coal
Co. from using the regulated pillar of coal as a place to mount a peg for a coat rack. See Pa.
Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
241. See discussion supra note 227 and accompanying text.
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to focus their regulatory takings arguments. The government will have
two ways to defend land-use regulations. First, the government can
attempt to prove that the regulated use is actually a duty the property
owner has towards others. To prove this, the government must show
that a reasonable person would recognize that the regulated use would
involve an unreasonable risk of harm to other persons or property. For
example, in Lucas, using this defense, the government could have
attempted to prove that a reasonable person would recognize that
development of the beachfront parcels would unreasonably risk harm to
the state's beaches by increasing the rate of beach erosion.4
The second defense available to the government is to prove that the
property retains a reasonable use despite regulation of the owner's
privilege to use. Again returning to Lucas, the government could
attempt to prove that a reasonable owner would reasonably rent the lots
to mobile venders. 3
Of course, such an argument would be open to attack by the
property owner, who is bound to argue that a reasonable owner would
have no reasonable use for the property subject to the regulation. In the
example presented, the property owner would argue that it is
unreasonable to expect a reasonable owner to rent the lots for a
reasonable sum under the circumstances.2" Likewise, the property
owner will also attempt to rebut any claim by the government that it is
simply regulating a duty.
V. CONCLUSION

The Takings Clause has been in dire need of judicial clarification for
the last eighty years. 45 While the Palazzolo case clarified the difference
between a Lucas claim and a Penn Central claim, the Court postponed
addressing other problems in takings law. 6 The doctrines primarily
relied upon to determine a taking-the economic-impact test and the
harm principle-are contradictory and elude consistent application. 7
The notion of investment-backed expectations is confusing,

.242. See generally Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
243. See generally id.
244. See generally id.
245. Regulatory takings has been a muddled area of the law at least since Mahon, 260
U.S. at 393.
246. See discussion supraPart II.
247. See discussion supraPart III.A.
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misunderstood, and often irrelevant." 8 In addition, because the
perceived bar on owners challenging regulations enacted prior to their
acquisition was recently lifted by Palazzolo, the confusion currently
found in the doctrine of investment-backed expectations is likely to
increase dramatically." 9 Likewise, the doctrine of nuisance is living up
to its name.5
Inevitably, the law of takings must be put in order. The proposed
standard presented in this Comment is relatively simple. As opposed to
determining which standard applies by evaluating the degree of
economic harm seemingly caused by the regulation, the threshold
question in the proposed analysis is as follows: "What type of right is
interfered with?"2" If in answering this question it is discovered that a
claim, power, or immunity is being subjected to interference, the
Takings Clause requires compensation. 2 If the infringed right is a duty,
the state has validly exercised its police power. 3 In either case, the
takings inquiry is finished.
Only if the regulation is found to have drastically restricted a
privilege-which will almost invariably be the owner's privilege to use
the land-is further analysis necessary. The purpose of the follow-up
inquiry is to determine whether the restriction on the property has
extinguished the owner's privilege of using the property. If, as a result
of the regulation, the owner is left with no reasonable use of the
property, compensation is required. 4
Noticeably absent from the proposed standard are the doctrines of
nuisance and investment-backed expectations. As previously discussed,
the nuisance doctrine is incorporated into the proposed duty standard.25
Investment-backed expectations, however, have been entirely omitted
from this Comment's proposed standard. The only remote resemblance
to investment-backed expectations found in this standard is the
requirement that, if the government regulates a privilege, the owner
must be reserved at least one reasonable use or else compensation is
due.f 6 The one reasonable use requirement is far less confusing and
248.
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251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
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speculative than investment-backed expectations."'
In sum, the proposed standard is more objective, more flexible, and
less confusing than the current takings doctrine. These benefits should
enable justice and logic to prevail. Given the land-use challenges facing
humankind this century, it is important that the Court adopt clear
standards upon which policy makers can rely.
ZACH WHITNEY*
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257. See discussion supra Part III.B.
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